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THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT:
AN EXTENSION SHORESIDE
P.C. Pfeiffer Company, Inc., v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979)
In P.C. Pfeiffer Company, Inc., v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979), a unanimous
Supreme Court held that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act' covers land-based workers engaged in moving cargo at any
point between ship and land transport, even if the workers are performing
tasks that have not been shifted shoreside by containerization. The decision
thus broadens the Court's prior holding in Northeast Marine Terminal, Inc. v.
Caputo,3 which had rejected the "point of rest" doctrine4 as a means of
determining whether the Act covers injuries incurred while engaging in a
particular activity.
1. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-576,
86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ ;01-950 (1970)) (codified in scattered sections of
33 U.S.C. (1976)). In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), the Court
held that states lacked the power to extend their compensation systems seaside of the
pier. After attempts to delegate that power to the States failed, Congress enacted the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1927). Prior to 1972, the Act, in Section 3(a), covered only injury occurring
"upon the navigable waters of the United States" (including any dry dock). In
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396"U.S. 212 (1969), the Court held that Congress
intended only that the Act fill the gap in coverage left after the Jensen decision. Conse-
quently, the Court also held that the Act covered only injuries occurring seaside of the
pier. Congress reacted to Nadirema by enacting the 1972 amendments. The 1972
amendments broadened the definition of "navigable waters" in Section 3(a) to include
"any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, marine railway, or other adjoining area custo-
marily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel." 33
U.S.C. § 903(a)(1976). At the same time, Congress added the requirement that to recov-
er under the Act, a person must be engaged in "maritime employment."
2. "A container is a large metal box resembling a truck trailer without wheels. It
can carry large amounts of cargo destined for one or more consignees .... [If it
carries goods destined for several consignees, it must be unloaded or 'stripped' and the
goods sorted according to consignee. This operation may be done at the waterfront or
inland. The analogous process during the loading phase is called 'stuffing."' Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 at 253 n.2 (1977).
3. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
4. According to the "point of rest" doctrine, the Act covers only injuries occurring
seaside of the cargo's initial "point of rest" on the dock, or in the case of loading, the
cargo's final "point of rest" before the cargo is loaded aboard ship. "Point of rest", is a
term of art, and, as used in the industry, is the point that separates the stevedoring
operation (seaside of that point), from the terminal operation function (shoreside of
that point). This point is usually the pier warehouse. Id. at 274-75.
(116)
P.C. PFEIFFER Co., INC. v. FORD
Respondent, Diverson Ford, an employee of Pfeiffer Company Inc., was
injured while fastening military vehicles onto flatcars. Several days before
the injury, a ship delivered the vehicles to port in Beaumont, Texas. The
vehicles were then stored on shore and, on the day before the accident, loaded
onto flatcars, which were to take the vehicles to their inland destination.
Ford could not directly load or unload a vessel because of agreements
between his union, his employer, and the Longshoremen's Union. Respondent
Will Bryant, employed in Galveston, Texas, by the co-respondent Ayers
Steamship Company,5 had been injured while loading cotton from a dray
wagon into a warehouse, where it was to be stored and later loaded onto a
ship by longshoremen. Bryant could not directly load or unload a vessel
because of agreements between his union, his employer, and the Longshore-
men's Union.
Each respondent initiated an action to recover for his injuries under the
Act. In each case, an Administrative Law Judge denied the claims for
longshoremen's compensation, holding, under the "point of rest" doctrine,
that neither Ford nor Bryant was engaged in "maritime employment" as
defined by § 2(3) of the Act.' Rejecting the "point of rest" doctrine, the
Benefits Review Board reversed both decisions.7 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the Review Board's decisions, holding that "an injured worker is a
covered 'employee' if at the time of his injury .. . he was . .. loading,
unloading, repairing, building, or breaking a vessel."' At the Supreme Court
level, the petitioners argued that a worker is engaged in maritime
employment only if, "[o]n the day of his injury, . . . the worker (was) subject
to being assigned by his employer to perform any part of his work on the
navigable waters of the United States [seaside of the shoreline]." The
Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and, in a per curiam
opinion, remanded the case for further consideration in light of Northeast
Marine." On reconsideration, the Fifth Circuit, in a brief per curiam opinion,
reaffirmed its prior decision."
5. The Director of the Office of Worker's Compensation Programs of the United
States Department of Labor was also a co-respondent in the appeals of both Bryant and
Ford. Texas Employer's Ins. Assoc. was also a co-petitioner.
6. Ford v. Pfeiffer Co., Docket No. 74 L.H.C.A. 181 (March 21, 1975); Bryant v.
Ayers Steamship Co., Docket No. 74 L.H.C.A. 89 (Feb. 28, 1975).
7. The decision of the Benefits Review Board in Bryant's case is reported in 2
B.R.B.S. 408 (March 21, 1975). The Board's decision in Ford's case is reported in 1
B.R.B.S. 367 (Nov. 13, 1975).
8. 533 F.2d 533, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1976).
9. Brief for Petitioners at 15; Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979).
10. 433 U.S. 904 (1977).
11. 575 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1978).
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The Supreme Court granted the petitioners' new request for certiorari and
subsequently affirmed the Fifth Circuit's later decision.
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell's first and strongest argument was
that Congress, in the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, set forth a status requirement which was
separate and distinct from the Act's situs requirement. Section 3(a) of the Act
provides the situs requirement:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but. only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used
by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). 2
The status requirement, contained in Section 2(3), further limits the Act's
coverage by defining an "employee" as,
any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshore-
man or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and
shipbreaker. 3
Thus, the Court argued that Section 2(3) refers to the nature of the
employment and is independent of the situs requirement. The Court felt that
the Act's structure demonstrated a congressional intent that the status and
situs tests be distinct. To give "maritime employment" a definition that
restricts the Act's geographical coverage would defeat this intent. Further,
the Court said that such a definition of "maritime employment," would be
inconsistent with the use of that term in Section 2(4) of the Act. That section
defines an "employer" as a person "whose employees are employed in
maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the
United States.' 4 The Court found that construing the term "maritime
12. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976). A "shipbreaker" is "one who breaks up vessels unfit
for further use and deals in their material." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3rd ed. 1976).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1976).
P.C. PFEIFFER Co., INc. v. FORD
employment" to contain an element of geographic restriction would make the
situs requirement in the last clause of Section 2(4) "virtually superfluous."' 5
The Court then examined the legislative history of the 1972 amendments
in an effort to shed more light on Congress's intent in expanding the Act's
coverage shoreside. Citing a passage from the Committee report, 6 the Court
noted that 1) the purpose of the "maritime employment" requirement was to
exclude from coverage workers employed in the situs area, but "not engaged
in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel;' 1 7 and 2) "[the]
legislative history discusses workers solely in terms of what they are doing,
and never in terms of where they are working."'" The Court added that,
In adopting an occupational test that focuses on loading and
unloading, Congress anticipated that some persons who work only on
land would receive benefits under the 1972 Act. An obvious example is
Blundo [an injured party in Northeast Marine]. He was checking and
marking cargo from a container that had been removed from a ship and
moved overland to another pier before it was opened. Without any
indication that he would be required to set foot aboard a ship, this Court
15. The petitioners cited two pre-amendment cases supporting their proposition
that "maritime employment" includes only work upon navigable waters. See Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1953); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 281 U.S. 133 (1930). The Court responded
Neither decision discusses what types of land-based loading or unloading opera-
tions might constitute maritime employment, probably because the situs require-
ment in the pre-1972 Act barred recovery for all injuries sustained on land. See
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, lsupra note 11.. . . In any event, the inter-
pretation of the pre-1972 Act cannot obstruct Congress's obvious intent to include
some landbased workers within the coverage of the current Act. 444 U.S. at 80
n.11.
The Court added that even petitioners acknowledged that the Act covers a
land-based crane operator moving cargo from ship to dock. The petitioners, however,
claimed that such activity, though covered, is not "maritime employment." The Court
rejected that argument, saying that Section 2(3) of the Act defines "employee" as "any
person engaged in maritime employment including . . . longshoring operations,"
(emphasis added), and not, as the petitioners would need to contend, "any person en-
gaged in maritime employment las well as] . . . longshoring operations." 444 U.S. at
77-78 n.7.
16. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). The House submitted a virtual-
ly identical report which is reprinted in 119721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698.
17. 444 U.S. at 79, quoting from S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 13.
18. 444 U.S. at 80.
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held that he was covered by the 1972 Act because this type of work was
maritime employment.'9
The Court added that, even when there is no containerized cargo, the
typical loading gang has workers who need never board a ship. Further, the
Court said, Congress heard testimony that 30-35 percent of shipbuilding and
repair is done on land.2" Even the petitioners recognized that both of these
classes of workers were covered by the Act."
. The Court then said that only the "point of rest" doctrine, which the
Court rejected in Northeast Marine, distinguished Bryant or Ford from
longshoremen performing the same work in other ports. Following the
Northeast Marine holding, the Court rejected that distinction in Pfeiffer as
being contrary to congressional intent. Again citing Northeast Marine, the
Court also rejected union membership as a ground for distinguishing Ford or
Bryant from longshoremen performing the same work."
19. Id. In fact, the Court did have such an indication. In Northeast Marine, the
Court said:
At the time of his injury . Blundo had been employed for five years as a
"checker".... As a checker he was responsible for checking and recording cargo
as it was loaded onto or unloaded from vessels, barges, or containers. Blundo was
assigned his tasks at the beginning of each day and until he arrived at the termin-
al he did not know whether he would be working on ship or on shore. He was
reassigned during the day if he completed the task to which he was assigned in-
itially.
432 U.S. at 252-53. However, in holding that the Act covered Blundo, the Court said
only that Blundo's injury occurred while he was performing an "integral part of the
unloading process as altered by the advent of containerization." Id. at 271-72. See
infra, note 35. Neither Ford nor Bryant were involved in such work. In holding that
Blundo's co-respondent, Caputo, who was injured while placing previously unloaded
goods into a delivery truck, was engaged in "maritime employment," the Northeast
Marine Court refused to decide whether Caputo would have been covered had he not
regularly loaded and unloaded cargo directly from or onto a ship. Instead, the Court
limited its holding, saying that, at least, "amphibious" workers in Caputo's position
were covered. 432 U.S. at 273-74.
20. 444 U.S. at 80-81; see also Hearings on S. 2318 et al., before the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 176
(1972) (testimony of Ralph Hartman, Bethlehem Steel Corporation).
21. See supra note 15.
22. Note that if the Court had decided that only workers who could work at least
some part of the day aboard a ship were covered, union membership could be a crucial
factor. Given the facts of the instant case, to say that union membership is or is not a
determinative factor in the outcome of the case would necessarily decide whether the
Act's coverage extends to cargo handlers who never board a ship. To hold that union
jurisdiction, as distinct from an employer's habits in assigning his workers' duties,
could limit the Act's coverage would seemingly violate Section 15(bi's prohibition of
employee waivers of protection. 33 U.S.C. § 915(b) (1976).
P.C. PFEIFFER Co., INC. V. FORD
"The crucial factor [in determining whether a worker meets the
'maritime employment' requirement of § 2(3)]," the Court said, "is the nature
of the activity to which [he] may be assigned." Citing Northeast Marine once
again, the Court recognized that "[p]ersons moving cargo directly from ship
to land are engaged in maritime employment."' Therefore, the Court
continued, workers responsible for some portion of that process, such as
Bryant and Ford, are also engaged in maritime employment.
In conclusion, the Court remarked that their decision was in keeping
with the congressional intent of the Act. The decision does not extend
coverage to all workers in the situs area. Workers whose only "responsibility
is to pick up cargo for further trans-shipment" would not be covered under
the Act.' Finally, the Court said that its decision further serves the federal
legislative intent of having "a simple, uniform standard of coverage"2"
The Pfeiffer decision demonstrates the Court's willingness to accord the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act a "liberal construc-
tion in keeping with the Act's purposes."27 The Committee report demon-
strates that the purpose of extending the Act's coverage shoreside went
beyond providing continuous coverage to workers who, under the old Act,
walked in and out of coverage during the course of their day's work as they
walked from shore to ship and ship to shore. Nor was that purpose limited to
protecting workers whose jobs were shifted shoreside when containerization
became a widely used cargo-handling technique. That report pointed out that
the injury frequency rate of longshoring was "well over four times the
average lof the rate] for manufacturing operations." 8 Further, the Committee
discussed the importance of a "workman's compensation system which
maximizes industries [sic] motivation to bring about . . . an improvement"
in working conditions as a means of lowering the high injury frequency
rate.' As the Pfeiffer Court noted, the Act's purposes could not be served by a
compensation system which, in effect, would allow coverage to shift with an
employer's whims. 0
Although the Committee said that their intent in expanding the Act's
coverage shoreside "was] to permit a uniform compensation system to apply
to employees who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their
23. 444 U.S. at 82.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 83, quoting S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 11.
26. 444 U.S. at 83.
27. 432 U.S. at 268.
28. S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 2.
29. Id.
30. 444 U.S. at 83.
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activity,"3' it is apparent that the Committee did not mean to imply that the
amendments limit coverage to employees who work, at least in part, over
water. That quote may mean that the intent of the Committee "Iwas] to
permit a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who, [save for
the strict territorial limitations of the present Act,] would be of a class of
workers covered by this act for part of their activity."3 Even should the quote
be interpreted as expressing the intent of the Committee "to permit a
uniform compensation system to apply to employers who, [without the
amendments,] would be covered by this act for part of their activity," that
statement does not necessarily mean that the Committee intended to extend
coverage exclusively to such workers. Certainly, nothing in the Act's
language or legislative history clearly implies such a limitation. Indeed, in
its summary, the Committee said that a purpose of the bill was to extend
coverage to additional workers." If coverage were limited solely to those
workers who had previously been covered by the Act for part of their activity,
no additional workers would be covered by the amendments. Therefore,
Congress must have intended that employees such as Ford and Bryant be
covered by the Act and its amendments." At most, the Pfeiffer Company
could only argue that the Committee report was ambiguous on whether the
amendments extended the Act's coverage to include land-based workers like
Ford and Bryant. In keeping with the liberal construction applied to the Act,
all ambiguities are resolved in "a way which avoids harsh and incongruous
results.""
Given that the Court considered the amendments to extend the Act's
coverage to some land-based workers who did not handle containerized cargo,
31. S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 11.
32. Id. The Federal Respondent's brief suggested that the quote was a result of a
draftsman's oversight. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 31, Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444
U.S. 69 (1979). Gilmore and Black warn against "tak[ingl the Committee Reports as
holy writ. . . . The Reports do not read as if they had been divinely inspired. As essays
in statutory construction, they do not commend themselves." G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-51.
33. S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 1.
34. The Senate Committee's reference, in their summary, to the extension of the
Act's coverage to additional workers, does not have a counterpart in the House report.
See supra note 33.
35. 432 U.S. at 268. It is not submitted that any doubts in the law are resolved in
claimant's favor. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 48 (2d
Cir. 1976), affd, Northeast Marine, supra note 2. To benefit from this rule of liberal
construction a party must convince the court that the Act is ambiguous. It is not
enough to convince the court that a particular construction of the Act causes a "harsh
or incongruous result." See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 223-24
(1969).
P.C. PFEIFFER CO., INC. V. FORD
the petitioners needed to resurrect some form of the recently crucified "point
of rest" doctrine to support his cause. They needed to contend that the Act
covers only workers who do at least some work shipside of the "point of rest."
However, the Court, in Northeast Marine, said that although the expression
"point of rest" was well known in the industry when the amendments were
drafted, that term appears nowhere in the statute or legislative history.
Therefore, the Northeast Marine Court found it difficult to believe that
Congress intended that term to be a decisive factor in the Act's status
requirement.3 Moreover, the inherent difficulties of determining the "point of
rest," and the ability of employers to shift that point landward or shoreward
at will, militate against application of the "point of rest" doctrine in the
instant case. That doctrine entirely conflicts with the intent of Congress to
provide uniform, simple, and equitable coverage for workers.37
Arguably, the decision of the Pfeiffer Court goes considerably beyond the
Court's holding in Northeast Marine. While the Northeast Marine Court held
that an employer could not defeat the purpose of the 1972 amendments by
merely shifting the "point of rest" shoreward, that Court noted that the 1972
amendments were enacted to remedy two evils of the old Act. These evils
were that the prior Act subjected the same employee to different coverage
depending merely on his location at the time of his injury, and that the prior
Act did not protect workers performing "longshoring operations that modern
technology had moved onto the land."' Thus, the real question the Court
faced in Pfeiffer was whether the amendments were intended to accommodate
possible future developments in cargo-handling techniques and technology
that may move still more tasks ashore. The Act's use of open-ended terms
such as "longshoring" and "longshoring operations" to describe activities
included in "maritime employment"'39 clearly demonstrates this intent. Had
the Pfeiffer Court held for the petitioners, an employer would have been able
to circumvent the Act merely by devising a system of unloading or loading a
vessel in which the most hazardous tasks would be performed by land-based
workers. Admittedly, allowing land-based workers to recover under the Act
36. 432 U.S. at 275. The petitioners also argued that workers handling container-
ized cargo were a limited exception to the Act's normal coverage, since the work per-
formed in checking and stuffing was analogous to work that, before the advent of con-
tainerization, was performed in the ship's hold. Further, the Committee report showed
a special concern for workers whose tasks were shifted shoreside by containerization.
See 432 U.S. at 273-74; Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, 539 F.2d 264, 265
(1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977). However, since the Act's language
suggests no such limited exception, this argument failed.
37. S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 12-13.
38. 432 U.S. at 276.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976).
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increases the uncertainty as to what constitutes "maritime employment."
However, this uncertainty is the necessary price of a compensation system
free of loopholes through which an employer can easily pass. Further, the
Pfeiffer Court offers some guidance as to what workers are engaged in
"maritime employment." Workers performing tasks "significant[ly]
relat[ed" '4 to "some portion"4' of "tasks traditionally performed by longshore-
men" are engaged in "maritime employment."" A similar test may be
invoked to determine the boundaries of "maritime employment" in general. It
is submitted that a court should find that a worker was engaged in "maritime
employment" if his duties included tasks functionally analogous to some part
of the "tasks traditionally performed by" longshoremen, harborworkers,
shipbuilders, or shipbreakers. 3
40. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 268
(1972); Odom Construction Co. v. United States Department of Labor, 622 F.2d 110
(5th Cir. 1980). In the context of the "maritime employment" requirement that "signifi-
cant relationship" should be that of a functional analogy. Otherwise a clerical worker
might still be deemed covered under the Act. See Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Farrell, 548
F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1977).
41. 444 U.S. at 83.
42. Id. at 82-83.
43. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976). The Third Circuit, while applying the "nature of
overall duties" test, held that an employee whose duties were found to be "primarily (if
not 'purely') ...clerical," could not recover under the Act for injuries he incurred
while acting in his capacity as a clerk, despite the fact that on occasion the worker
checked cargo. Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Farrell, 548 F.2d 476, 477 (3d Cir. 1977). The
court said that, "on occasion he left the office to examine markings on cargo, and that
in the past he had worked as a checker is not controlling. What is controlling is the
nature of his primary duties. As we perceive the congressional intent, that is the sole
test. Farrell's primary duties being that of a clerk and not a checker, he is excluded
from coverage." Id. at 478. Although the result in Maher is sound, the court's reference
to an employee's "primary" duties is unfortunate and needlessly vague. The test should
not be whether one's "primary" duties are maritime, but whether one's maritime re-
sponsibilities are so insignificant as to be negligible, in which case that worker would
not be covered by the Act while performing non-maritime activities. Restated affirma-
tively, the test should be whether a worker spends a significant amount of his time
performing maritime activities. See Odom Construction Co. v. United States Depart-
ment of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1980). Such a test is simple, equitable, and
serves Congress's desire to exclude from coverage purely clerical employees, and work-
ers "whose only responsibility is to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment." S.
REP. No. 1125, supra note 16, at 13. The suggested test is inapplicable if at the precise
moment of his injury the worker was performing a "maritime activity." For example,
had Farrell been injured while checking cargo, he should have been covered under the
Act. This is so, because the test only determines whether a worker's overall duties are
sufficiently maritime in nature that he may be considered to be "engaged in maritime
employment" even at those times when he is performing activities that are not mari-
time. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976).
P.C. PFEIFFER CO., INC. V. FORD
Since the Pfeiffer decision holds that the concept of "maritime employ-
ment" looks only to the function of a worker the location of his and not to his
workplace, a seeming paradox results. A trucker who loads or unloads his
truck on a situs within the Act is covered. However, a worker constructing a
sewage drain over navigable water is not covered by the current Act, even
though he may have been protected under the pre-1972 Act." This paradox is
resolved when one realizes that the "maritime employment" requirement
focuses the Act on activities "bearing] a significant relationship to tradition-
al maritime activities."45 Thus, a maritime locality alone does not bring an
activity within the ambit of the Act."6
Pfeiffer v. Ford follows both the spirit and the letter of the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The holding of the Court that the scope of "maritime employment" includes
all workers who move cargo from ship to land transportation reflects the
intent of Congress to eliminate the impractical technicalities that weakened
the pre-1972 Act. By using a functional definition of "maritime employment"
when interpreting the 1972 Act, the Court continues its trend of recognizing
the impact of contemporary cargo-handling techniques on the working man."7
The Court has imposed only those limitations upon the Act that are clearly
required by the Act's terms.
Barry A. Edelberg
44. Fusco v. Perini North River Associates, 601 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated,
444 U.S. 1028, rev'd on rehearing, 622 F.2d 1111, 1113 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 1113.
46. Executive Jet Aviation, supra note 40.
47. Fusco, supra note 44; See also Executive Jet Aviation, supra note 40.
48. See Northeast Marine, supra note 2.
